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vicious experiment, we should certainly
forfeit the respeot of humanity if we
should fail to act upon what is so
clearly our duty and our responsibility,
to see to it that the world is led
further along that great experiment
which was begun in the City of Phila-
delphia.
Limitations on the Functions of International Courts
By EDWIN M. BORCHARD, PH.D.
Professor of Law, Yale University
M UCH of the discussion on the de-sirability and feasibility of an
international court has been based
upon the premise that a court would
furnish a substitute for war, that na-
tions wanted a court for the settlement
of their disputes, and that the actual
establishment of a court would per-
suade nations to submit their differ-
ences for adjudication. The topic, of
&dquo;Functions of International Courts and
Means of Enforcing their Decesions,&dquo;
might indicate a belief that the debat-
able or open questions concern the
functions of a court already created and
the means necessary to carry its awards
into execution. It will be my neces-
sary, but ungrateful, duty to dispel the
illusions and the misconceptions of fact
involved in the assumptions of the
major premise above mentioned.
No one would discourage the judicial
settlement of disputes, and the desira-
bility of such adjustment has been gen-
erally admitted by thinking men. The
devoted efforts of certain societies and
organizations for the establishment of
an international court, the promise of
certain statesmen to build a new world
order upon the basis of such a court,
and a widespread sentimental faith in
the efficacy of the judicial process in
settling the issues that arise among
organized groups have served, I believe,
to arouse expectations that can not be
met and to confuse rather than enlight-
en the public mind. Inasmuch as prog-
ress can rarely begin from misunder-
standing, it has seemed to me more
useful to examine the manifest limita-
tions upon the functions of an interna-
tional court, than to extol the virtues
of a court still to be created; my belief
being that knowledge of the facts as
they are, at least as my study discloses
them, will prove of greater practical
utility than an indulgence in the ideol-
ogy of facts as they ought to be.
The belief that a judicial court
would furnish a substitute for war has
been one of the most common of the
assumptions prevailing among impor-
tant groups in many countries. The
example is cited of the readiness and
effectiveness with which our Supreme
Court decides issues between states of
the union, and the conclusion is drawn
that obviously the same method could
be adopted among the nations. Noth-
ing could, in my opinion, be more erro-
neous. The existing order of interna-
tional life, at least among the larger
powers, is conditioned upon a continual
struggle for economic advantage, in the
preservation of home markets by tar-
iff and discriminations against more
favored competitors; in the endeavor
to capture foreign markets against the
competition of commercial rivals; in
the assurance of a steady and cheap
supply of raw materials on the part of
manufacturing nations, leading to com-
peting efforts to control backward
areas, colonies, protectorates, manda-
tories and other fields of investment,
and to acquire the incidental machinery
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and equipment necessary to make this
enterprise successful,-merchant fleets,
cables, trade routes, coaling and oil
stations, and finally, armies, navies and
alliances. With national security and
economic prosperity the key-note and
motive, raw materials and markets the
major aims, and the instrumentalities
just mentioned as the minor objectives,
a picture is presented of the principal
operative forces and factors which con-
dition and shape international rela-
tions. Foreign policy is fashioned to
the maintenance of supremacy in the
continual struggle for national aggran-
dizement, of which these forces and fac-
tors, in varying degree, constitute the
main and essential elements.
Bearing this in mind, it will be appar-
ent that the issues created by this unin-
terrupted competition for advantage-
supported by the people of each coun-
try on the very highest justification of
self-preservation and prosperity-be-
get conflicts of interest which are not
legal, but economic and political in
character. Whether the Argentine or
the Chinese market shall be captured by
British, German, French or American
commerce; whether the unsuccessful
competitors will become reconciled to
their loss of markets; whether the coal-
ing and cable stations of the world are
too largely controlled bycertain nations
for the safety of the foreign trade of
other countries; in what degree the raw
materials of the mandated territories
and the colonies of the world are to be
monopolized by the countries in imme-
diate control-these questions, merely
typical of the many that agitate the
nations, present no issue of right or
wrong which can be settled by an inter-
national court, any more than can the
rivalry between two ardent youths for
the affections of a fair damsel. Yet it
is these very conflicts of interest that
f urnish the most effective causes of war.
Is it not apparent, therefore, that so
long as international trade implies ri-
valry between national units organized
politically and commercially with all
the instruments of unfair competition,
the hope of an international court as a
substitute for war rests upon the weak-
est of justifications? No such eco-
nomic issues are presented by the diff er-
ences among our states with their free
trade, so that the alleged analogy for
an international court which is sought
to be found in our Supreme Court
deciding cases between the states-dis-
putes of a rather limited class, pertain-
ing usually to boundaries and minor
matters-is quite misleading, and un-
warranted. While international tri-
bunals have settled many important
issues,-notably the Alabama Claims,
the North Atlantic Fisheries dispute,
dozens of boundary and claims cases-
which might have led to war, they have
not settled and can not settle those
larger economic and political issues
which lie at the foundation of most
modern wars.
Another common assumption is
that the nations seriously desire an in-
ternational court for the settlement of
their disputes. This again I believe to
be erroneous; at least experience would
indicate that very often it has no basis
in fact. Nations desire an interna-
tional court, and have no difficulty
in establishing one ad hoc when the
occasion arises, when the dispute is
unimportant or would not justify the
expense of war; or when political con-
siderations dictate submission to arbi-
tration rather than recourse to war-in
short, when they feel they have more
to gain by arbitration or other form of
peaceful settlement, such as mediation,
than by war.
A few modern instances will suffice to
give evidential support to this conclu-
sion. In 1894 a plebiscite was to have
been held in accordance with the
Treaty of Ancon between Peru and
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Chile to determine the sovereignty of
the provinces of Tacna and Arica, now
in the possession of Chile. The plebis-
cite has never been held. Continued
efforts by Peru to submit this question
to arbitration or to commit Chile to the
principle of arbitrating international
disputes have been unavailing. The
reason is obvious. So long as Chile has
the physical strength to hold what she
has, she has little interest in inviting
the uncertain, and what to her may
seem the academic hazards of arbitra-
tion. This case, like many others,
would indicate the need for compulsory
arbitration, but as will presently ap-
pear, the larger powers are still averse
to being compelled to adopt peaceful
measures when other measu res seem to
them more expedient or profitable.
In 1914, two Mexican subordinate
officers were alleged to have insulted
the American flag at Tampico. The
facts were in dispute, and are to this
day, for the original telegram of the
American admiral in command has not
been published. At that time, we had
already negotiated and were still en-
gaged in negotiating treaties with va-
rious countries, the so-called Bryan
treaties, by which incidents giving rise
to differences between the contracting
parties were to be submitted to a com-
mission of inquiry, pending whose re-
port hostilities were to be suspended
for the period of a year. No better
opportunity for the application of this
principle could have been presented
than the Tampico incident. Yet Presi-
dent Wilson, irritated at the obstinate
refusal of President Huerta to abdicate
his office, and oblivious to his own de-
clared principle of a peaceful settle-
ment of disputes, found in the incident
that overt act which was deemed to
justify the making of war on Mexico
and the sacrifice of the lives of numer-
ous Mexicans and Americans at Vera
Cruz.
More recently, Austria, irritated at
the continued efforts of Servia to create
disaffection in and detach from the em-
pire her southeastern Slav provinces,
found in the assassination of Archduke
Ferdinand so great a strain upon her
patience that she refused to tolerate a
judicial settlement of the differences
with Servia, and launched upon an ex-
pedition of chastisement which ulti-
mately engulfed the world and led to
her own ruin and that of a large part
of Europe.
And now France, gravely injured,
disappointed and belligerent, finds al-
most irresistible the impulse to invade
and crush Germany, and resents any
effort to adjust the issues between the
two countries by mediation or arbitra-
tion. The fact that the enterprise
may again engulf Europe in war and
ruin victor and vanquished alike be-
yond hope of recovery appears to be a
secondary consideration only.
These illustrations are cited to dispel
the illusion that nations in dispute
desire judicial machinery for the settle-
ment of their differences and that the
great need of the world to bring about
such settlement is an international
court. On the contrary, nations that
believe they have more to gain or are
likely to be more successful in war than
in arbitration or peaceful settlement,
prefer the arbitrament of the sword
and resent the efforts of mediators to
frustrate the accomplishment of their
objects. Indeed, it happens often
that the greater the belief in the right-
eousness of the national cause, the less
disposition there is to submit it to
peaceful arbitrament; and it is not
unknown that the strength of the con-
viction of righteousness is in direct
ratio to the national military and
economic resources. It is not a world
court that is needed, but the intelli-
gence to realize that war is in practi-
cally all cases the most wasteful and
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ultimately the most senseless method of
settling international conflicts of inter-
est. So long as the causes of war re-
main unchecked and uncontrolled,
there is little hope for a decrease of
war; and if I judge correctly, the
Treaty of Versailles, if permitted to
remain the charter of the European
settlement, condemns the coming gen-
erations to frequent and recurring
wars.
Much propaganda has been spread
to prove the necessity for an interna-
tional court in continuous session, and
much labor has been expended on
actually bringing into being an inter-
national court of justice. The effort
has been accompanied by an increasing
number of treaties of arbitration among
the nations. The greatest difficulty in
carrying out the plan, however, is not
how to execute the award of an inter-
national tribunal, to which subject
much unnecessary zeal and earnestness
have been devoted, but how to per-
suade and, if needed, compel, nations
to submit their disputes to a court.
My research fails to disclose more than
half a dozen cases, among thousands,
in which the award of an international
tribunal has been refused execution by
the losing nation. These have nearly
always been small nations, the dispute
a question of boundaries, and the
ground of refusal an alleged error of
jurisdiction. In view of the extremely
unimportant nature of the question,
therefore, it would seem unprofitable
to spend much time in discussing it.
What is important, however, is the
inability to compel unwilling nations to
submit to a court. It has already been
shown that the very nature of the
serious conflicts of interest among na-
tions makes a submission to judicial
settlement hardly practicable, or at
least exceedingly difficult. Yet this
is not the only reason why nations, in
concluding arbitration treaties, nearly
always exclude from the obligation of
arbitration questions of independence,
national honor and vital interest-the
only questions that are of any impor-
tance, and the only questions which
could conceivably lead to war. Exist-
ing treaties of arbitration among the
greater powers, therefore, constitute
obligations to submit to arbitration
anything they wish to submit and
nothing more. The Covenant of the
League of Nations, mistakenly hailed
by many good people as a hopeful
substitute for war, carefully avoided
any change in this purely voluntary
submission to arbitration. The Per-
manent Court of Arbitration at the
Hague, created in 1899 and strength-
ened in 1907, and still the most prac-
tical achievement by way of an in-
ternational court, leaves submission
voluntary. More recently, under the
auspices of the League of Nations, a
body of distinguished jurists conceived
and proposed a plan of a court of
international justice, in permanent
session, with obligatory jurisdiction.
Hardly had the plan been presented to
the Assembly of the League of Na-
tions at Geneva, than the Council,
consisting principally of the Great
Powers, decided that the obligatory
feature of the jurisdiction of the court
was an undesirable innovation. Na-
tions that have the political or economic
stimulus to make and the physical
ability to enforce their decisions prefer
to be the judges of their own causes,
and the sheriffs as well.
Nor can I see that a court of per-
manent judges is preferable, in the
present organization of the nations, to
a court of judges selected by the liti-
gating nations from a panel. So long
as jurisdiction is entirely voluntary,
more actual arbitration will result from
a court of judges selected by the parties
ad hoc than from a court in whose com-
position the litigating nations had no
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choice; for a nation that does not have
to submit its dispute with another will
surely not submit it to a court, to any
of whose judges it takes exception.
The international court of justice,
therefore, seems to me much less
practical then the existing Permanent
Court of Arbitration at the Hague,
which has already decided nearly
twenty cases and to which the United
States and Norway have recently sub-
mitted a dispute arising out of the
requisitioning of Norwegian vessels by
the United States.
Nor is a judicial decision of necessity
a guaranty of peace. One need but
refer the student of American history
to the Dred Scott decision of the United
States Supreme Court to be convinced
of this. That decision made the Civil
War inevitable. Other cases might be
mentioned. Some years ago Ecuador
and Peru submitted their boundary
dispute to the arbitration of the Coun-
cil of State of Spain. After deliberat-
ing on the matter, the Council of State
let it become known that their award,
still unannounced, placed the line at
a point which would give much terri-
tory to Peru and leave Ecuador with
a very small area. Both countries
realized that the award, if handed
down, would precipitate war between
the two nations, so, at the suggestion of
the litigating countries, the award has
been withheld by the Spanish Council
of State.
Just what was meant, therefore, by
the campaign announcement last fall
that a scheme for a world association
would be constructed around an inter-
national court for the settlement of
disputes between nations has been
something of a mystery. One is led to
suspect that its advocates had not
thought deeply on the subject. As a
plan for an ordered community life
among the nations, it holds out even
es s hope than the League of Nations;
and the belief that the latter holds out
little beyond a prospect of entanglement
of the United States in the intrigues of
Europe is, I think, entirely justified.
From what has been said, it may
have become apparent that the value
and utility of an international court are
limited by the prevailing conditions of
international relations and the factors
and forces which dictate and fashion
those relations. They make it evident
that an international court can not
settle those larger issues which lie at
the foundation of most international
conflicts, and that nations that have
the physical power still prefer to be the
judges of their own causes and resist
any plan to bring about a compulsory
submission of disputes. If compulsion
could be brought about to submit even
the narrow range of questions that are
susceptible of judicial settlement, such
as pecuniary claims for injuries to
individuals, questions of interpretation
of treaties and other questions of law,
with a stipulation that these can not
be considered questions of national
honor or vital interest, some progress
will have been made, but the difficulty
of obtaining official acquiescence even
in this mild proposal will indicate the
enormity of the greater task of pro-
moting a more general resort to judi-
cial methods of settling international
disputes.
If I judge correctly the temper of the
world, there is less disposition now to
adopt the civilized methods of adjust-
ing conflicting interests than there has
been for generations. Few people
realize or are willing to contemplate
the facts that six years of devastating
war and devastating peace have under-
mined the moral foundations of many
densely populated areas of the world;
and that there is now more faith in
the efficacy of f orce-and less faith
in law-as a solution for international
differences, than there has been since
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the days of Napoleon. The forces of
disintegration are apparently over-
powering the forces of reconstruction,
due primarily, I believe, to the short-
sighted policy of the present managers
of European political affairs.
So long as that condition prevails,
discussion of the enlarged functions of
an international court will be to a great
extent academic and theoretical. Yet,
however limited the functions of such
an international court may be, I am
inclined to believe that in the absence
of obligatory jurisdiction, more practi-
cal results can be achieved from the
existing so-called Permanent Court at
the Hague, selected by the litigating
nations from a panel of judges, than
from a court of fixed judges in constant
session-however strong in theory may
be the conceptual appeal of a supreme
court of the world.
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